

CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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ACTION NEA-11

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 EA-10
DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NSCE-00 ARA-16 NSAE-00 SSO-00
SY-05 HA-06 TASE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OCT-02 INRE-00
SAL-01 ICAI-00 SYE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /119 W
-----266344 101640Z /52

O P 101026Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1916
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGER PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAUGHEN GE PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD 1581

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/10/87 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, IZ
SUBJ: FURTHER IRAQI REACTION TO THE ISRAELI RAID

1. (CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WITH LIMITED LOCAL CONTACTS, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR
DIPLOMATS IN BAGHDAD TO MONITOR PUBLIC OPINION HERE.
HOWEVER, SEVERAL NON-POLITICAL IRAQIS HAVE EXPRESSED
TO US SURPRISE AT THE STRENGTH OF POPULAR REACTION TO
THE RAID WHICH THEY DESCRIBE AS HAVING UNITED THE
IRAQI PEOPLE AND CREATED A FEELING OF DEEP BITTERNESS
AGAINST ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A NATURAL ASSOCIA-
TION IN MOST ARAB MINDS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES, IRAQI IRE HAS APPARENTLY NOT BEEN TRANSFERRED
TO US TO THE EXTENT WE THOUGHT LIKELY. OUR OFFICIAL
STATEMENTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLICIZED BY THE
VOICE OF AMERICA, BBC, AND NOW CARRIED BY THE IRAQI
PRESS, HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

3. THE OFFICIAL IRAQI LINE REMAINS STEADY AND CALM
WITH NO ATTACKS THUS FAR ON THE U.S. WORLD-WIDE
CONDEMNATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN HEAVY PUBLICITY AND
PROBABLY HELP LESSEN THE NEED FOR THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP
TO "DO SOMETHING." ALL CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
HAVE BEEN CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, INDIVIDUALLY
OR IN REGIONAL GROUPS, TO BE GIVEN A SOLEMN VERSION

OF IRAQI CONCERN, THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONDEMN
THE ISRAELI RAID, BUT SO FAR AS WE KNOW, THERE HAS
BEEN NO REQUEST FOR THEM TO JOIN IN ANY SPECIFIC SANCTIONS.

4. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
WHICH WILL GET UNDERWAY JUNE 11 WILL, AMONG
OTHER THINGS, DISCUSS SECURITY COUNCIL TACTICS AND
DECIDE HOW FAR THEY WISH TO GO IN PRESSING FOR PUNITIVE
ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL, AS OPPOSED TO A SIMPLE CONDEMN-
ATION.

5. MANY IRAQIS PROBABLY HOPE THAT SOMEHOW IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE ISRAELI RAID A PRETEXT CAN BE FOUND BY
IRAQI AND IRANIAN LEADERS TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES
QUICKLY AND TURN AGAINST A COMMON ENEMY. HOWEVER, THE
IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC
BRIEFINGS CONTINUES TO LINK THE ISRAELI RAID WITH IRAN,
AND WE NOTE THAT TEHRAN IS LINKING THE ISRAELIS WITH
SADDAM AND THE U.S. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD LIKE
TO END THE WAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN THEIR PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES THEY MUST GUARD AGAINST A POPULAR BACKING
AWAY FROM THE STRUGGLE AGAINST "THE PERSIAN ENEMY."

6. MANY OBSERVERS IN BAGHDAD BELIEVE ISRAEL MADE A
SERIOUS MISTAKE IN ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE RAID SINCE THIS HAS MOBILIZED IRAQI, ARAB AND
WORLD OPINION IN A WAY THAT A MORE AMBIGUOUS ISRAELI
HANDLING OF THE SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE DONE. EAGLETON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY J.L. DATE 9/30/82

EDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

TS AUTH. REASON(S)

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